Politics, Rights, and the Refugee Problem by Dagger, Richard
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2005
Politics, Rights, and the Refugee Problem
Richard Dagger
University of Richmond, rdagger@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and
the Political Theory Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dagger, Richard. "Politics, Rights, and the Refugee Problem." In War and Border Crossings: Ethics When Cultures Clash, edited by Peter
A. French and Jason A. Short, 185-97. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
m 
Politics, Rights, and the 
Refugee Problem 
RICHARD DAGGER 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt 
pointed to the years between World War I and World War II as the time when 
the plight of refugees became a pressing political problem.' If Arendt were still 
alive (she died in 1975), she would no doubt agree that the problem is at least 
as pressing in the early twenty-first century as it was sixty or more years ago, 
when she herself was a refugee from Nazi Germany. Who would not agree? Ac-
cording to a report of the U.N. Population Division, 16 million people were 
refugees at the end of 2000, most of them to be found in Asia (9 million) and 
Africa ( 4 million).2 Obviously the plight of refugees is a pressing problem to-
day. But is it a pressing political problem? 
Someone might hold, for instance, that coping with refugees is a logistical 
nightmare or a matter of grave humanitarian concern but not a political prob-
lem. What I hope to show in this chapter is that the refugee problem remains 
as it was in the years between the world wars, a problem for political thinkers 
and actors. More than a single problem, it is a set of interrelated problems, 
three of which I shall focus on here: the conceptual problem, the balancing 
problem, and the human rights problem. 
THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM 
It may seem unduly abstract-even inhuman-to say that refugees present a 
conceptual problem. Refugees, after all, are people, not concepts, who may 
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have lost family, friends, home, and possessions as they fled from danger. Nev-
ertheless, part of the refugee problem must be conceptual, for we cannot ad-
dress the problems of refugees without determining who is a refugee or who 
ought to count as one. Reaching this determination is often a difficult, con-
tentious, and unavoidably political matter. This is because the conceptual 
problem has two sides. First, like many other concepts, the concept of refugee 
is open-ended enough to leave room for interpretation, judgment, and dis-
pute. This problem could be overcome if we could fix on an exact, indis-
putable definition of "refugee." But such a definition cannot be found 
because-and this is the second side of the problem-the concept has a polit-
ical dimension. 
It may be helpful to begin by comparing the concept of refugee to another 
common but imprecise concept-criminal. In both cases the concept contains 
standards for determining who does and who does not fall under it. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary, for instance, defines criminal as a "person guilty or 
convicted of a crime." Someone who is guilty or convicted of a crime thus falls 
under the concept of criminal, and anyone who is neither guilty nor convicted 
does not. In similar fashion, a refugee is, according to the OED's leading defi-
nition, "One who, owing to religious persecution or political troubles, seeks 
refuge in a foreign country; orig[inally] applied to the French Huguenots who 
came to England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685." The 
Huguenots were refugees, then, but French Protestants seeking entry into 
England in the early twenty-first century would be hard put to establish that 
religious persecution in France had made refugees of them. 
Both criminal and refugee concepts carry implications for how the people 
who fall under them are to be treated. Thus it is important to have standards 
for deciding who counts as a criminal or a refugee. Criminals are to be appre-
hended and punished, or at least admonished, because they are guilty of 
wrongdoing. Refugees are to be protected, granted asylum, and ultimately 
repatriated, relocated, or permanently settled in the host country, for they are 
the victims of wrongdoing. Other immigrants should be treated with respect 
or even hospitality, but their claims for consideration and assistance are not as 
strong as those of the refugee. 
Here, however, is where the difficulties arise. With refugee, as with crimi-
nal, there are problems involved in determining whether the concept fits par-
ticular people. Before we call someone a criminal, we want to know-we 
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should want to know-whether that person really did commit a crime, and 
certainty is often hard to achieve in these cases. By the same token, we want to 
know whether people had genuine reason to fear persecution or "political 
troubles" when leaving their country, and the evidence that distinguishes the 
true refugee from the mere immigrant may be as hard to come by as the evi-
dence that convicts the guilty criminal and sets the innocent person free. In 
both cases, moreover, questions of severity or seriousness may be trouble-
some. Strictly speaking, people who commit a traffic offense have broken the 
law, but we typically call these people "offenders" because their offense does 
not seem serious enough to warrant branding them as "criminals." In much 
the same way we may admit that someone did indeed face "political troubles" 
or persecution of some sort in her country, yet doubt or even deny that these 
troubles were severe enough to justify granting her refugee status. I will have 
grounds for complaint, for example, if the people I work with mock me, shun 
me, or pass me over for promotion because of my religious or political views; 
such shabby treatment may even give me reason enough to move to another, 
more congenial country. But it will not give that country (or any other) suffi-
cient grounds to accept me as a refugee. 
It is instructive, in light of this comparison of the concepts of refugee and 
criminal, to consider the definition of refugee established by the United Na-
tions in the Geneva Convention of 1951-the same year in which Arendt first 
published The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to this definition, a 
refugee is a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is 
unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country."3 This definition is more expansive than the OED's, but 
it is no less susceptible to the problems involved in determining who does 
and who does not count as a refugee. To begin with, there is the difficulty of 
deciding whether someone's fear of persecution is truly "well-founded." 
There is also the problem of distinguishing refugees from those whom the 
United Nations and others define as "economic migrants," that is, people who 
voluntarily leave their country in hopes of a better life elsewhere. This is a 
necessary distinction, but its analytical value does not free it from practical 
problems, especially when it appears that people are leaving their homeland 
because their governments somehow prevent them from making a decent 
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living. This was one of the issues in the dispute between the Reagan admin-
istration and the leaders of the sanctuary movement in the 1980s. The ad-
ministration resisted the attempts of people from Central America to enter 
the United States on the grounds that they were "illegal immigrants" seeking 
to move here for economic reasons, to which the sanctuary activists re-
sponded that the "refugees" from Guatemala, El Salvador, and elsewhere were 
victims of political oppression-including oppression that made it all but 
impossible to support themselves. 
Adding to these conceptual difficulties are complications that arise when 
people claim refugee status as victims of forms of oppression that do not fit 
obviously into the U.N. definition of refugee. Female genital mutilation and 
homosexuality provide pertinent examples. Should we regard a family that 
flees from a country in which their infant daughter would be expected to un-
dergo female circumcision as a family of refugees? Is a homosexual who lives 
in a country that proscribes homosexual acts persecuted as a member "of a 
particular social group" and thus eligible for refugee status according to the 
United Nations? If we answer yes to these questions, as the United States and 
some other countries have done in the case of female genital mutilation, then 
we are stretching the concept of refugee. We also stretch it when we say that 
female circumcision and hostility toward homosexuals are relevant forms of 
persecution when they are widely accepted cultural practices even though they 
lack the force of law. 
And perhaps we should. That is the attractive quality of imprecise, open-
ended concepts: Their flexibility allows us to adapt them to changing circum-
stances and attitudes. But there is no denying that they also entangle us in 
conceptual disputes, as I have been trying to show. 
These disputes are further complicated by the second side of this concep-
tual problem: Our attempts to define "refugee" necessarily involve moral and 
political judgments. To see how, we need only consider the difference between 
refugees and fugitives. Both words derive from the Latin fugere, to flee, but 
"fugitive" is a broader term than "refugee;' and it typically implies a condem-
nation of the person who is called a fugitive. An escaped convict is a "fugitive 
from justice," for example, not a "refugee." To call someone a refugee, however, 
is to cast aspersions not on that person but on those who drove her to seek 
refuge. Refugees are by definition the innocent victims of people who have 
mistreated them or who threaten to do so. 
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The concept of refugee entails a political as well as a moral judgment be-
cause it implies a failing on the part of the refugee's state or government. To 
return to the U.N. definition, a refugee is "unable to or ... unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection" of the country of his nationality. The government 
of the refugee's country is guilty of injustice, incompetence, or negligence. 
Why else would the refugee be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the gov-
ernment's protection? If the refugee is unable to count on the government's 
protection, it must be for one of two reasons: either the government itself is 
trying to oppress or persecute him or the government lacks the desire or the 
ability to protect him from oppression or persecution by others. If the refugee 
is unwilling to count on the government's protection, it must be owing to his 
lack of faith in the government's ability or willingness to protect him. When-
ever we say that someone is a genuine refugee, in short, we are judging her 
government as in some way unjust, incompetent, or negligent. 
The refugee problem, then, is necessarily a political problem because the 
conceptual difficulties of deciding who does and who does not count as a 
refugee are also political difficulties. Political leaders and functionaries do not 
enjoy being told that they are either actively engaged in injustice or derelict in 
their duty, but that is what we tell them when we declare that people who have 
left their countries are refugees. No wonder, then, that the concept of refugee 
is so sensitive-and so likely to give rise to controversy. 
THE BALANCING PROBLEM 
Let us suppose that we solve the conceptual problem and put an end to dis-
putes about who is or ought to be considered a refugee. There are 16 million 
people who call themselves refugees, let us say, and each and every one of 
them is universally taken to be a genuine refugee. In these circumstances, 
would the plight of refugees continue to be a political problem? 
Yes, it would, and the balancing problem explains why. By "balancing prob-
lem" I mean simply that the government of any country that takes in substan-
tial numbers of refugees will have to find some way to balance the interests of 
the refugees against those of its own people. This balancing act would not be 
necessary if the interests of current citizens were identical to those of the 
refugees, to be sure, but even a utopian would be unlikely to believe that a com-
plete identity of interests is possible in these circumstances. Some conflict of 
interests is inevitable and significant conflicts are likely. Governments will have 
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to try to resolve these conflicts, and that means that refugees will present a po-
litical problem to the governments of host countries. 
Conflict is inevitable because refugees are typically highly dependent peo-
ple, at least for some time after their arrival in the host country. Even those 
who manage to escape their persecutors with plenty of money are likely to 
find themselves strangers in a strange land, and therefore in need of assistance 
in adapting to their new circumstances.Typical refugees, unfortunately, escape 
with little more than the clothes on their backs. Someone else must pay the 
costs of meeting their needs. To the extent that these costs fall on the people 
of the host country, there will be a conflict of interests between the refugees 
and the citizenry. 
This conflict is most obvious in economic terms. Providing for the basic 
needs of refugees-food, shelter, clothing, health care, security, and so on-is 
a costly enterprise, and money and other resources spent on their behalf can-
not be used for other projects or purposes. In time, of course, costs should 
dwindle as the refugees either leave the country or support themselves. If nei-
ther repatriation nor relocation to another country is possible, however, an-
other kind of economic conflict could easily appear as refugees begin to 
compete for jobs. The more anxious people are about their economic security, 
the more the government will have to strain to balance the interests of 
refugees with those of citizens. 
Less obvious, perhaps, but not necessarily less troublesome are conflicts 
that are social or cultural in nature. Refugees are people whose lives have been 
drastically disrupted, but they may also prove, through no fault of their own, 
to be disruptive influences in the host country. Racial, tribal, linguistic, reli-
gious, and other differences often produce social tensions or open hostility be-
tween the refugees and the people of the host country. In some cases, the clash 
of cultures may even lead to conflict among different groups of refugees. In ei-
ther case, the government of the host country will have to find some way to 
ease the tensions and resolve the conflicts. We may wish that people would rise 
above their petty, narrow-minded, or parochial concerns to welcome and even 
embrace refugees; some people do just that. But we cannot count on such al-
truistic behavior, and consequently the plight of refugees will continue to pose 
a political problem for the governments that try to help them. 
This problem will persist even on the utterly unrealistic assumption that the 
conceptual problem has been solved. Dropping that assumption will show how 
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deeply political the refugee problem really is. When country A accepts people 
from country B as refugees, as we have seen, the government of A is implicitly 
accusing the government of B of injustice, incompetence, or negligence-an ac-
cusation that is not likely to make for happy relations between the two coun-
tries. Those relations will almost certainly worsen if some of the refugees take 
steps to bring down the government of B. If this happens, as it often does, the 
refugees may embroil the host country in a conflict that threatens its stability or 
even its survival. Inasmuch as the first duty of a government is to protect and 
defend its people, the government of A will have another reason for balancing 
the interests of refugees against the interests of its citizens. With the balancing 
problem, in sum, as with the conceptual problem, there is every reason to think 
that the plight of refugees does indeed pose a pressing political problem. 
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
It may be tempting to hold that the best way to deal with refugees is to let 
them fend for themselves. But it is neither possible nor right to do this. It is 
not possible because governments cannot ignore or turn their backs on 
refugees; at the least they will have to take measures to keep refugees out of 
their countries. Some governments will find these measures less burdensome 
than others-governments of countries that are distant from the places that 
the refugees are fleeing, in particular-but no government in this age of glob-
alization will be able to count on geography to keep it free from people seek-
ing asylum. 
Nor would it be right, if it were possible, to leave refugees to fend for them-
selves. A genuine refugee is like a drowning person. If we can rescue that per-
son without endangering our own lives, it would be wrong to leave him to 
drown; if we can provide shelter and succor to refugees without endangering 
ourselves, it would be wrong to turn them away. Indeed, some would say that 
we should be actively searching for refugees and other persons in distress 
whom we may help, and not merely waiting until they call themselves to our 
attention. Whether such active assistance is morally required or beyond the 
call of duty, however, is a question that I shall not pursue here. It is enough to 
say that morality requires us not to turn away the refugees at our door if we 
can take them in without threatening serious harm to ourselves. 
That qualification-without threatening serious harm to ourselves-is im-
portant. There are cases m which refugees, again like drowning swimmers, are 
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likely to take their would-be rescuers down with them. Who, for example, 
would consider a government blameworthy for turning away a refugee in-
fected with a deadly, highly contagious disease? Other cases will prove more 
troubling. Suppose that the tyrannical acts of my powerful government send 
a stream of refugees to the border between your country and mine, where they 
are beseeching your militarily weak government to provide them a place of 
refuge. Suppose further that these people pose no danger in themselves to 
your country, but the government of my country has made it plain that it will 
regard any aid given to these "fugitives" to be a hostile act and an invitation to 
invade your country. Would your government deserve praise if it nevertheless 
took in the refugees? Would it deserve blame if it did not? In such circum-
stances, it seems that the best your government can do is to try to find some 
way of escaping the horns of the dilemma. As refugees themselves too often 
find, however, escape routes are not always available. 
So the qualification is an important one. We must do what we can to help 
refugees as long as we can do so without threatening serious harm to our-
selves. But in acting with this qualification in mind, we must be sure to take 
"serious harm" quite seriously. It is all too easy to conclude that inconvenience 
or slight risk is excuse enough to refuse entry or aid to refugees. 
This may seem to be merely a way of restating the balancing problem. Gov-
ernments must do what they can to aid refugees so long as they do not 
threaten serious harm to their own countries, but the harm in question must 
be serious enough to outweigh the harm that the refugees will be likely to suf-
fer if they are turned away. But there is more than balancing involved here, at 
least for the governments of those countries that profess to believe in human 
rights. In these cases, treatment of refugees is also a matter of integrity-of 
acting on one's principles and living up to one's commitments. In a country 
such as the United States, with its endorsement of the U.N. Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and its historic evocation of an inalienable right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, consideration for the rights of 
refugees must be more than a matter of balancing their interests with those of 
U.S. citizens. 
The plight of refugees is not the only challenge to those of us who profess 
to believe in human rights, but it puts this challenge in particularly striking 
form. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "Everyone has 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."4 
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That statement is not only universal-everyone has the right-but uncom-
promising-to seek and enjoy asylum. It seems to entail that we have a duty 
to provide safe haven to any genuine refugee who asks us for it, with no bal-
ancing of interests allowed. Where human rights are at stake, in short, the only 
question integrity seems to allow us to ask is whether we can admit refugees 
without threatening truly serious harm to ourselves. 
There is one other question that the language of the Universal Declaration 
allows. When it states that "everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution," it does not impose the duty of asylum on 
any particular country. Some government has a duty to afford asylum to this 
particular group of refugees, in other words, but it does not have to be our 
government. The problem, of course, is that the lack of specificity in Article 
14 gives governments an excuse to turn away refugees. The government of 
Country X can maintain that the duty to provide asylum falls not on it but on 
Country Y, which is in a better position to aid them, or Country Z, which has 
not been bearing its fair share of the burden where refugees are concerned, or 
on other unspecified countries in general. The result is a kind of passing the 
buck-or sometimes quite literally passing the refugees-that makes a mock-
ery out of the claim that there is a human right "to seek and enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution." 
That is why the plight of refugees poses a special problem for those who be-
lieve in human rights. We might try to avoid the problem by saying that there 
is a difference between having a right and being able to exercise it, as we do 
when we say that someone who is bound and gagged has the right to freedom 
of expression even when she is not able to express herself. That distinction will 
not help in this case, however, for Article 14 states that everyone has the right 
to "enjoy" asylum. We might then proceed to amend Article 14 so that it rec-
ognizes a right to seek but not to enjoy asylum. But the effect of this amend-
ment would be to take pressure off those countries that could provide refuge 
and make the condition of refugees even more desperate-hardly a desirable 
outcome if our aim is to secure human rights. Or, finally, we might try to make 
Article 14 more effective by taking steps to identify the country or countries 
that have the duty to provide asylum. We could not identify them by name, 
but we could say that the duty falls on the "nearest" safe country, or the "most 
culturally similar" country, or the "economically strongest" country, for ex-
ample. But such an attempt at specificity would only lead to disputes as to 
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which country is really nearest or most similar or economically strongest, and 
then to further disputes as to whether being nearest counts more than cultural 
affinity and less than economic strength, and so on. 
We cannot escape the problem refugees pose for human rights simply by 
reformulating a principle. Refugees have claims on those of us who are fortu-
nate enough not to be refugees ourselves, and we must find some way to up-
hold those claims. If we do not, we put the belief in human rights itself in 
jeopardy. This was Hannah Arendt's point when she declared that the period 
between the world wars of the twentieth century was the time when refugees 
first became a pressing political problem. "Once they had left their homeland 
they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; 
once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the 
scum of the earth."5 When neither the state from which they were fleeing nor 
the state to which they fled would afford them safety or recognition, the 
refugees found themselves to be, for all practical purposes, deprived of their 
rights. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to sustain the belief that human 
rights is anything more than a phrase. 
This is the sense in which refugees pose a fundamental problem for human 
rights. If we really believe in human rights, we must find some way to meet the 
needs of refugees. If we fail to do so-and especially if we make no real effort 
to help them-we call into question both our commitment to human rights 
and their very existence. Refugees in our time may not as often be the prod-
uct of totalitarian regimes as they were in Arendt's time, but the challenge they 
present to human rights remains the same: 
the incredible plight of an ever-growing group of innocent people was like a 
practical demonstration of the totalitarian movements' cynical claims that no 
such thing as inalienable human rights existed .... The very phrase "human 
rights" became for all concerned-victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike-
the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.6 
CONCLUSION 
How are we to avoid "hopeless idealism" or "feeble-minded hypocrisy" today, 
when there are 16 million or more refugees in the world? The answer, in my 
view, is to adopt a stance of chastened yet hopeful idealism. Our idealism must 
be chastened because the refugee problem-the three refugee problems that I 
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have distinguished in this chapter-is not something that admits of a com-
plete, once-and-for-all solution. There is no reason to think that we can hit on 
a definition of refugee that will settle all disputes about who is and who is not 
a genuine refugee, nor is there any reason to believe that we will discover a for-
mula that tells us exactly how to balance the interests of the current citizens 
with those of refuge-seekers. In these respects the refugee problem will remain 
a political problem. But it is a problem that we will be better able to handle, if 
not solve, once we understand why it is so troublesome. 
That is why there are grounds for an idealism that is hopeful as well as chas-
tened. In fact, there is reason to believe that progress has been made since 
1951, when Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism appeared and the Geneva Con-
vention established a definition of refugee for international law. International 
cooperation in general and the United Nations in particular have put us in a 
better position than were the people between the world wars to deal with the 
refugee problem. Through the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), 
it is now possible to do more for those people who have been rendered state-
less-to provide them not only with food, shelter, and medical care but also 
with assistance in regaining their rights-than was possible in the 1930s and 
1940s. Beyond this direct aid to the refugees, moreover, the United Nations 
has been able to put pressure on governments to be clear about how they dis-
tinguish refugees from other would-be immigrants and to carry something 
like a fair share of the load of refugee relief. This pressure has not been fully 
effective-far from it-but it does indicate how international cooperation can 
establish norms that help countries do what they can to respect the human 
rights of refugees. 
As I have tried to show, governments will often have good reason to ignore 
or neglect the claims of refugees. The first responsibility of a government is 
to its own people, and governments may well think that providing aid and 
comfort to refugees will necessarily come at the expense of the people the 
government is supposed to serve. They may thus have a tendency to exagger-
ate the threat that refugees present to the safety and welfare _of their own cit-
izens. By establishing international norms, however, and by funding agencies 
to enforce and carry out those norms, governments can tie their own hands 
in ways that make it easier for them to act on behalf of the rights of refugees. 
Instead of making a case to their citizens for greater aid to refugees, in other 
words, governments may say that the existing commitment to the Universal 
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Declaration and the policies of the UNHCR require the government to take 
in more refugees, or to contribute in some other way to their relief. Equally 
important, and perhaps more so, is the way in which governments can use 
these international norms and agencies to put pressure on one another. We 
are doing our part, they may say, so why aren't you-especially when you 
profess your steadfast devotion to human rights? In this way governments 
may engage in what Garrett Hardin has called, in another context, "mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon" to increase efforts to alleviate the suffering 
of refugees. 7 Finally, and perhaps most important, these same international 
norms and agencies offer the best hope we have of taking effective measures 
to halt the persecution and oppression that turn peaceful people into 
refugees in the first place. 
Is this too sanguine or idealistic a view of what international cooperation 
can do? It is certainly not an accurate statement of what international coop-
eration has accomplished. When the refugee population is at 16 million or 
more, we can hardly claim that the U.N. work in this regard has been a great 
success. Nor do memories of recent events in Rwanda, Bosnia, Indonesia, and 
elsewhere inspire confidence in the benefits of international cooperation. Still, 
it seems clear that more is being done in an organized fashion on behalf of 
refugees today than in the decades before World War II-and before the cre-
ation of the United Nations. It also seems clear that much more can be done 
if the states that have pledged themselves to the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and to the Geneva Convention will provide the United Nations 
the support it needs to carry out its mission. Some will worry, of course, that 
their state would be surrendering its sovereignty to the United Nations if it 
provided this support. To enter into an arrangement of "mutual coercion, mu-
tually agreed upon," however, is not to surrender sovereignty. It is, instead, to 
strengthen the hands of those who would protect human rights by con-
fronting the refugee problem-the position of anyone who is a chastened yet 
hopeful idealist with regard to the refugee problem. 
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